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Emotion regulation is commonly characterized as involving conscious and intentional
attempts to change felt emotions, such as, for example, through reappraisal whereby one
intentionally decreases the intensity of one’s emotional response to a particular stimulus or
situation by reinterpreting it in a less threatening way. However, there is growing evidence
and appreciation that some types of emotion regulation are unintentional or incidental,
meaning that affective modulation is a consequence but not an explicit goal. For example,
affect labeling involves simply verbally labeling the emotional content of an external
stimulus or one’s own affective responses without an intentional goal of altering emotional
responses, yet has been associated with reduced affective responses at the neural and
experiential levels. Although both intentional and incidental emotional regulation strategies
have been associated with diminished limbic responses and self-reported distress, little
previous research has directly compared their underlying neural mechanisms. In this study,
we examined the extent to which incidental and intentional emotion regulation, namely,
affect labeling and reappraisal, produced common and divergent neural and self-report
responses to aversive images relative to an observe-only control condition in a sample of
healthy older adults (N = 39). Affect labeling and reappraisal produced common activations
in several prefrontal regulatory regions, with affect labeling producing stronger responses
in direct comparisons. Affect labeling and reappraisal were also associated with similar
decreases in amygdala activity. Finally, affect labeling and reappraisal were associated with
correlated reductions in self-reported distress. Together these results point to common
neurocognitive mechanisms involved in affect labeling and reappraisal, supporting the idea
that intentional and incidental emotion regulation may utilize overlapping neural processes.
Keywords: affect labeling, reappraisal, emotion regulation, fMRI, amygdala, prefrontal cortex
INTRODUCTION
Emotion regulation refers to processes that alter the character
or intensity of emotional experiences. The capacity to effec-
tively regulate negative emotional experiences, in particular, is
essential for healthy mental and physical functioning (Gross and
Thompson, 2007). Such control helps us navigate and survive the
inevitable ups and downs of everyday life. While emotion reg-
ulation is commonly thought of as referring to conscious and
intentional attempts to change felt emotions, there is growing
evidence and appreciation that some types of emotion regula-
tion are unintentional, automatic, or incidental byproducts of
processes set in motion to serve non-regulatory goals (Mauss
et al., 2007; Berkman and Lieberman, 2009; Berkman et al.,
2009; Koole and Rothermund, 2011). As such, various emotion
regulation strategies may be categorized as either “intentional”
or “incidental.” While intentional and incidental emotion reg-
ulation seem to have similar emotion-modulatory effects, little
research has directly compared their underlying neural mech-
anisms. Therefore, in this study, we compared intentional and
incidental emotion processing, namely, reappraisal and affect
labeling, at the neural and experiential levels, to examine the
extent to which they involve common vs. distinct neural and
psychological mechanisms.
Reappraisal is one of the most commonly used and stud-
ied emotion regulation strategies (Gross and Thompson, 2007;
Kalisch, 2009; Hartley and Phelps, 2010). Reappraisal involves
intentionally decreasing the intensity of one’s emotional response
to a particular stimulus or situation by reinterpreting it in a
less threatening way. A person is using reappraisal when she
tries to “look on the bright side” or “find the silver lining” of
an undesirable event or situation. In fact, developing effective
reappraisal skills is one of the core components of cognitive
behavioral therapies for anxiety disorders, which ostensibly repre-
sent pathologically poor emotion regulation (Craske, 2003; Gross
and Thompson, 2007). At the neural level, reappraisal has been
associated with increased activity in ventrolateral prefrontal cor-
tex (VLPFC), posterior dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC),
and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), although the precise
location of activations in these areas have varied across studies,
perhaps due to differences in specific stimuli, response timing,
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and task instructions (Berkman and Lieberman, 2009; Kalisch,
2009; Ochsner and Gross, 2005). Reappraisal is also consistently
associated with consequential decreases in amygdala activity and
self-reports of distress (see Ochsner and Gross, 2005; Quirk and
Beer, 2006; Phillips et al., 2008; Berkman and Lieberman, 2009
for reviews).
Affect labeling typically involves verbally labeling the emo-
tional content of a stimulus, such as labeling an angry facial
expression as “angry” or a fearful facial expression as “fearful”
(Hariri et al., 2000, 2003; Lieberman et al., 2005, 2007). Although
such affect labeling may not seem like an emotion regulation
strategy on the surface—mainly because it does not involve an
intentional goal of changing felt emotions—several findings sug-
gest that it constitutes a form of incidental emotion regulation.
Like reappraisal, this form of affect labeling while viewing aver-
sive images is associated with diminished self-reports of distress
(Lieberman et al., 2011), and in translational studies, has pro-
duced physiological or behavioral outcomes associated with a
reduced fear response (Tabibnia et al., 2008). Additionally, several
studies have demonstrated a pattern of neural responses dur-
ing this type of affect labeling that overlaps with the pattern for
reappraisal, primarily including increased VLPFC activity and
decreased amygdala activity (Hariri et al., 2000, 2003; Lieberman
et al., 2005, 2007; Foland et al., 2008; Payer et al., 2011; Gee et al.,
2012).
In the present study, we examined a more personally-relevant
form of affect labeling. Specifically, we modified the typical affect
labeling instructions so that participants labeled their own emo-
tional responses to aversive stimuli rather that simply labeling the
emotional content of external stimuli. Accordingly, this form of
affect labeling constitutes a more ecologically-valid form of inci-
dental emotion regulation since affect labeling in everyday life
and therapeutic contexts likely involves labeling one’s own affec-
tive reactions. One previous study found that labeling one’s own
emotional responses resulted in reduced fear responding, includ-
ing decreased physiological and behavioral outcomes (Kircanski
et al., 2012; see also Satpute et al., 2012). These findings suggest
that this form of affect labeling likely produces similar effects as
labeling the affective content of external stimuli. However, no pre-
vious studies to our knowledge have examined the neural bases of
labeling one’s own emotional responses and the consequences for
diminishing affective responses.
Despite apparent similarities in the consequences and mech-
anisms of affect labeling and reappraisal, only a few studies have
compared them to identify specific functional similarities and dif-
ferences. In one behavioral study, Lieberman et al. (2011) found
that labeling external emotional stimuli and reappraisal produced
correlated reductions in self-reported distress such that individu-
als who benefited from one strategy tended to benefit from the
other as well. A second study (Payer et al., 2012) examined neu-
ral responses during reappraisal and affect labeling of external
emotional stimuli measured on different days in a small sample
(N = 9). Anatomical ROI analyses yielded correlated reductions
in amygdala activity from the two emotion processing strate-
gies such that those with larger reductions in amygdala activity
during reappraisal also tended to have larger reductions in amyg-
dala activity during affect labeling. No previous studies to our
knowledge have compared the neural bases of reappraisal and
personally-relevant affect labeling.
The current investigation examines both common and diver-
gent neural and self-report effects of personally-relevant affect
labeling and reappraisal. A large sample was included (N = 39)
to avoid any issues of statistical power. We hypothesized that
personally-relevant affect labeling and reappraisal would engage
multiple overlapping lateral prefrontal regulatory regions, includ-
ing VLPFC, and result in decreased amygdala responses and self-
reported distress. We also hypothesized that reappraisal would
result in more widespread prefrontal activation than affect label-
ing because it seems to represent a more complex effortful
psychological process (Kalisch, 2009). Results of this study will
enhance our understanding of how we can modulate our emo-
tions, which has both basic and clinical implications. For exam-
ple, identifying specific common neural regions in this study
will lay the groundwork for future studies to explore the pre-
cise mechanisms that are most effective in regulating affective
responses. Additionally, evidence verifying common underly-
ing neural mechanisms for intentional and incidental regulation
would support further research into novel treatment strategies
for emotion-related disorders that focus on enhancing inciden-
tal emotion regulation which may be less aversive and thereby
more appealing to certain patients, resulting in decreased rates
of treatment dropout.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Participants (Ps) aged 55–85 years were recruited from the UCLA
community and Los Angeles area via newspaper advertisements
to participate in the study as part of a larger project examin-
ing the effects of an 8-week mindfulness-based stress reduction
(MBSR) program. If deemed potentially eligible during a tele-
phone screening, participants were scheduled to come to the
UCLA campus to complete a detailed, in-person screening. Of 70
individuals invited to complete an in-person screening, 41 were
eligible and participated in the study. Two Ps were excluded from
the analyses due to excessive head motion during fMRI scanning,
leaving a final sample for the fMRI results of 39 Ps ranging in
age from 55 to 75 (M = 64.65, SD = 7.25; 8 male, 31 female).
Self-report data collected during scanning, as described below, is
missing for an additional two individuals due to technical difficul-
ties and thus, self-report results reflect a sample of 37 people. All
individuals provided informed consent prior to completing the
in-person screening. Importantly, the MBSR intervention com-
ponents of the study were all subsequent to the scanning reported
on here. Results of the larger intervention study will be published
in a separate manuscript.
Inclusion and exclusion criteria
Inclusion criteria were: (a) English-speaking adults 55–85 years
of age at time of entry; (b) post-menopausal and not pregnant,
if female; and (c) willing and able to come to UCLA for all study
related activities. Participants were excluded if they: (a) were not
ambulatory, (b) indicated any treatment for mental health prob-
lems in the last 6 months, (c) indicated any major physical health
problems in the last 3 months, (d) used medications affecting
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cardiovascular or endocrine function, (e) indicated regular use of
psychotropic medication or psychotherapy in the last 6 months,
(f) indicated any use of doctor-prescribed cholesterol lowering
medications (e.g., statins), (g) used any doctor-prescribed pain
medication, (h) indicated any implants, (i) exhibited cognitive
impairment as indicated by a score lower than 23 on the Mini-
Mental State examination (Folstein et al., 1975), (j) smoked, (k)
practiced regular (>1 time per week) mind-body therapy (e.g.,
meditation, yoga, tai chi) anytime in the last 6 months, (l) were
left-handed, (m) had non-removable metal in their bodies (other
than dental fillings), (n) indicated feeling claustrophobic in con-
fined spaces, such as an fMRI scanner, and/or (o) weighed over
300 lbs1.
General procedures
Following the in-person screening, eligible, and interested partic-
ipants were scheduled to complete an fMRI session, during which
they completed the affect labeling and reappraisal task described
below. Immediately prior to entering the scanner, participants
were given detailed instructions on the different conditions of the
task and given a chance to practice the task. Participants discussed
each of their responses with the experimenter to make sure they
understood the instructions and were able to adequately complete
the task prior to being scanned. All scanning sessions were com-
pleted prior to participants beginning the MBSR intervention.
Participants were paid $50 for their participation, plus $16 reim-
bursement for parking. Our research protocol was approved by
the UCLA Office for the Protection of Human Research Subjects’
Institutional Review Board.
fMRI affect labeling and reappraisal task
While being scanned, participants were shown photographs of
negative emotionally-evocative scenes (from the International
Affective Picture System; IAPS; Lang et al., 2008, as described
below) presented in a blocked design and were instructed to either
passively view the stimuli, or use one of two emotion regulation
strategies, affect labeling or reappraisal. A non-emotional shape-
matching task was also included as a control condition indexing
simple cognitive-motor responses. Other conditions, such as neu-
tral and positive scenes were included, but are not discussed
further in this manuscript. Thus, there were four conditions
(i.e., types of trials) that were analyzed for this manuscript (see
Figure 1). (1) In trials for the observe condition (Observe), par-
ticipants passively viewed a single negative emotionally-evocative
scene. For this condition, participants were told to simply look
at each picture. (2) In trials for the affect label condition (Label),
participants viewed a single negative emotionally-evocative scene
and chose the label from three words at the bottom of the
screen that best matched their own emotional response to the
scene. For this condition, participants were presented with three
1A major goal of the larger intervention study was to examine the effects
of mindfulness meditation training on neural, psychological, and immune
system functioning in healthy older adults. Thus, our inclusion and exclu-
sion criteria were fairly strict in order to obtain a sample of physically and
mentally healthy older adults naïve to mind-body practice and free of med-
ications and/or conditions that might artificially influence immune systems
functioning.
A B
C D
FIGURE 1 | Stimuli. Sample screens from the (A) Reappraisal, (B) Label,
(C) Observe, and (D) Shape Match conditions. Although specific images for
Reappraisal, Label, and Observe were distinct, they were matched on
content, valence, and arousal. (Note: The pictures shown in Figure 1 are
similar to the stimuli used in this study, but are not actual IAPS images.)
response options taken from the following possibilities, “Sad,”
“Anxious,” “Disgusted,” and “Other.” Importantly, “Other” was
always offered as an option in case participants experienced an
emotion not captured by the other response options or did not
have any emotional response at all. The response options were
balanced across blocks, with the order of the response options
counterbalanced across blocks. (3) In trials for the reappraise
condition (Reappraise), participants viewed a single negative
emotionally-evocative scene and used cognitive reappraisal to
decrease their emotional response to the scene. Specifically, par-
ticipants were told to try to decrease their emotional response to
each image by thinking about it in less distressing terms and were
given examples of how to accomplish this. For instance, if they
saw a picture of a woman in the hospital, rather than imaging
how bad this is, they could think about how the woman was in the
hospital to get better and would be healthy again very soon. They
could also think that a distressing scene was not real but instead
just a scene from a movie constructed using special effects. (4)
In trials for the shape-matching condition (Shape Match), par-
ticipants saw a target geometric shape and chose the shape from
three options at the bottom of the screen that matched the top tar-
get shape. Blocks of trials were separated by a fixation crosshair.
As mentioned above, participants were given ample opportunity
to practice all conditions until they felt comfortable using each
strategy prior to entering the scanner.
Negative scene stimuli were taken from the IAPS set (Lang
et al., 2008). Negative scenes were selected as those with the
highest combined negative valence and arousal, based on previ-
ous IAPS ratings (Lang et al.). These valence and arousal ratings
were matched across the Observe, Label, and Reappraise con-
ditions [valence: F(2) = 0.004; p = 0.99; arousal: F(2) = 0.046;
p = 0.96]. The normative valence and arousal ratings for each
condition were as follows: Observe-valence M(SD) = 2.79(1.05);
Observe-arousal = 5.94(0.76); Label-valence = 2.80(0.95);
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Label-arousal = 5.96(0.65); Reappraise-valence = 2.82(0.86);
Reappraise-arousal = 5.89(0.83). Additionally, the content of the
scenes (e.g., snake, burn victim, funeral scene) was matched
across these three conditions 2. The specific stimulus-condition
pairings were the same for all participants.
There were 4 blocks of each of the 4 condition types, with
each block consisting of 5 trials. Each trial was 6 s long, with
the stimulus presented for the entire trial length. Each block
was preceded by a 10-s fixation crosshair, during which time
participants were instructed to focus their attention on the
crosshair, and a 5-s instruction cue indicating the condition
type for that block (i.e., Observe, Affect Label, Reappraise, or
Shape Match). Immediately following each block, participants
provided ratings of how unpleasant they felt on average during
the immediately preceding block, on a scale from 0 to 3 where
0 = “Not at all unpleasant,” 1 = “Somewhat Unpleasant,” 2 =
“Moderately Unpleasant,” and 3 = “Severely Unpleasant.” Four
random orders of the conditions were created and counterbal-
anced across participants.
Stimuli were presented on a Macintosh computer using
MacStim 3.2.1 software (WhiteAnt Occasional Publishing,
www.brainmapping.org/WhiteAnt) and high-resolution magnet-
compatible goggles (Resonance Technology, Inc). Button press
responses were collected using an MR-compatible button box
connected to the Macintosh.
Image acquisition
Data were acquired on a Siemens Sonata 1.5T scanner at the
UCLA Ahmanson-Lovelace Brainmapping Center. Head move-
ments were restrained with foam padding. High-resolution
structural T2-weighted echo-planar images (spin-echo; TR =
5000ms; TE = 33ms; matrix size 128 × 128; 32 axial slices;
FOV = 20-cm; 3-mm thick, skip 1-mm) were acquired coplanar
with the functional scans. Eight functional scans were acquired
(echo planar T2∗-weighted gradient-echo, TR = 3000ms, TE =
25ms, flip angle = 90◦, matrix size 64 × 64, 32 axial slices,
FOV = 20-cm; 3-mm thick, skip 1-mm). Voxel size = 3.125 ×
3.125 × 3mm.
fMRI data analysis
The imaging data were analyzed using Statistical Parametric
Mapping (SPM5; Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology,
Institute of Neurology, London, UK) and MarsBaR (Brett et al.,
2002), a region of interest (ROI) toolbox. Functional images
for each participant were realigned to correct for head motion,
coregistered to the high-resolution structural images, normal-
ized into a standard stereotactic space as defined by the Montreal
Neurological Institute (MNI), and smoothed with an 8mm
Gaussian kernel, full width at half maximum, to increase signal-
to-noise ratio. Final voxel size for all analyses was 3 × 3× 3mm.
2The specific IAPS images included in this study were as follows. Observe:
3530, 9250, 9480, 9253, 1111, 3102, 6250, 1070, 6836, 9041, 6540, 5940, 3261,
3350, 1112, 3000, 8475, 9570, 6242, 2141. Label: 3068, 1201, 1726, 6571, 2710,
8485, 3140, 1301, 6831, 3230, 3030, 9921, 1114, 3280, 2750, 6260, 3064, 6555,
2800, 1030. Reappraise: 3000, 6313, 1113, 9430, 2590, 6821, 1090, 9230, 2661,
3051, 6510, 9050, 3062, 1080, 2053, 3010, 1200, 3180, 2692, 2900.1.
Experimental blocks were modeled using a boxcar function con-
volved with the canonical hemodynamic response. Linear con-
trasts were computed for each participant using a fixed-effects
model. For group analyses, contrast images were pooled together
in random-effects analyses, ensuring valid inference to the sam-
pled population.
To examine regions commonly activated during affect label-
ing and reappraisal, we used SPM5 to assess the conjunction null
hypothesis, which yields voxels that are significantly activated
across multiple contrasts. Specifically, we assessed the conjunc-
tion null hypothesis for two sets of contrasts, first, Label >
Observe and Reappraise>Observe, and second, Label<Observe
and Reappraise < Observe. We examined common activity for
affect labeling and reappraisal relative to passive observation
of negative scenes specifically in order to identify activations
reflecting the “regulatory” aspect of these conditions rather than
merely the perception of negative emotionally-evocative stimuli.
Specifically, comparison against the Observe condition controls
for processes involved in the passive observation of negative stim-
uli. To examine regions differentially activated for affect labeling
and reappraisal, we examined group-level main effects analyses
for the contrasts directly comparing affect labeling and reap-
praisal (i.e., Label> Reappraise and Label< Reappraise).
Given our strong a priori hypotheses regarding activity in spe-
cific brain regions (i.e., bilateral amygdala and PFC), our analyses
focused on these regions of interest (ROIs) which were defined
using an anatomical atlas (Automatic Anatomical Labeling atlas,
AAL; Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002) within SPM5. Analyses were
statistically thresholded using either an uncorrected conjunction
p-value threshold of 0.003 (Price and Friston, 1997; conjunc-
tion analyses only) or a standard uncorrected p-value threshold
of 0.005 (main effects analyses only), coupled with cluster-
extent significance thresholds of 4 and 24 contiguous voxels
for the amygdala and entire PFC, respectively, which accounts
for multiple comparisons in each ROI as calculated using the
program AlphaSim (http://afni.nimh.nih.gov/afni/doc/manual/
AlphaSim). Activations in other brain regions were thresholded
using the same p-value thresholds as described above, coupled
with a cluster-extent significance threshold of 43 contiguous vox-
els, which accounts for multiple comparisons across the whole
brain based on calculations using AlphaSim.
Finally, given that affect labeling and reappraisal utilized differ-
ent response modalities (i.e., option selection with button press
vs. free-form cognition), we repeated the analysis directly com-
paring Label > Reappraise, but additionally used a technique
designed to isolate activity consistent with the motor response
processes unique to affect labeling. We first created a whole-brain
mask based on the results of a one-sample t-test for the con-
trast Shape Match vs. implicit baseline, consisting of a fixation
crosshair, thresholded at p < 0.005. This mask ostensibly isolates
activity corresponding to response selection with a corresponding
motor button press, in the absence of any emotional processing.
As such, when this mask is applied to the analysis comparing
Label > Reappraise, any remaining significant activations may
reflect differences in response modality since they overlap with
the activations seen during simple motor response, whereas acti-
vations that are no longer significant when this mask is applied do
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not overlap with the regions involved in motor response selection
and therefore likely reflect differences other than those underlying
response modality.
RESULTS
SELF-REPORTED DATA
Following each block, participants rated how unpleasant they
felt during the preceding block, on average, using a scale of 0
(not at all unpleasant) to 3 (severely unpleasant). Consistent
with predictions and as shown in Figure 2, unpleasantness ratings
were significantly lower for the Label [M(SD) = 1.96(0.48)] and
Reappraise [M(SD) = 1.75(0.49)] conditions relative to Observe
[M(SD) = 2.24(0.51)], suggesting that both affect labeling and
reappraisal were effective in reducing self-reported distress [Label
vs. Observe: t(36) = 3.59, p = 0.001; Reappraise vs. Observe:
t(36) = 5.74, p < 0.001]. Directly comparing the two regulation
strategies, Reappraisal was associated with lower self-reported
unpleasantness than Labeling [t(36) = 3.02, p = 0.005]. The zero-
order correlations for the three conditions were significant and
positive [Label vs. Reappraise: r = 0.59, p < 0.001; Label vs.
Observe: r = 0.54, p = 0.001; Reappraise vs. Observe: r = 0.44,
p = 0.006], suggesting a similar response pattern in general for
each participant across conditions. Nevertheless, self-reported
unpleasantness ratings during Label and Reappraise continued
to be significantly positively correlated even when controlling for
ratings during Observe (pr = 0.46, p = 0.005), indicating that to
the extent individuals were able to use reappraisal to reduce their
self-reported unpleasantness, they were proportionately able to
use affect labeling to reduce their self-reported unpleasantness.
NEURAL RESPONSES COMMON TO AFFECT LABELING AND
REAPPRAISAL RELATIVE TO OBSERVE
We first examined common increased activations for Label and
Reappraise relative to Observe (i.e., the conjunction of Label >
Observe and Reappraise > Observe). As shown in Table 1 and
Figure 3, we found increased activations in RVLPFC (51, 27, 0;
t = 3.23; 29 voxels), RDLPFC (51, 24, 45; t = 2.92; 106 voxels;
and 21, 57, 30; t = 2.67; 65 voxels), a large cluster of activity
on the left side (505 voxels) extending from LVLPFC (−54, 30,
6; t = 3.22) to LDLPFC (−33, 3, 63; t = 3.71), as well as pos-
terior DMPFC (0, −6, 75; t = 3.90; 519 voxels; 12, 15, 48;
t = 2.00; 27 voxels) during Label and Reappraisal relative to
Observe. Together, these findings suggest that affect labeling and
reappraisal utilize a number of overlapping prefrontal regions
that have been associated with affect labeling and/or reappraisal
in separate previous studies (Ochsner and Gross, 2005; Berkman
and Lieberman, 2009; Kalisch, 2009).
We also examined common decreased responses during Label
and Reappraise relative to Observe (i.e., the conjunction of
Label < Observe and Reappraise < Observe). As predicted, there
was significantly less bilateral amygdala activation during Label
and Reappraise relative to Observe (24, −6, −15; t = 2.04; 10
voxels; −30, 0, −21; t = 2.98; 134 voxels; see Figure 3), suggest-
ing that both strategies were effective in emotion down-regulation
at the neural level. Figure 5 shows extracted parameter esti-
mates of bilateral amygdala activity during Label, Reappraise,
and Observe relative to the non-emotional Shape Match condi-
tion (i.e., Label > Shape Match, Reappraise > Shape Match, and
Observe > Shape Match) to illustrate that amygdala activity dur-
ing affect labeling and reappraisal is significantly reduced relative
to passive observation. As shown in Table 1 and Figure 3, other
common decreased activations were seen in ventral medial PFC
(VMPFC), subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (subACC), medial
temporal lobe/peri-amygdala, fusiform gyrus, and a cluster span-
ning the parietal cortex and precuneus. Decreased VMPFC and
subACC during affect labeling has been observed previously
(Lieberman et al., 2007).
Differential responses during affect labeling and reappraisal
To examine regions differentially activated during affect label-
ing and reappraisal, we compared affect labeling and reappraisal
directly (i.e., Label > Reappraise and Label < Reappraise). As
seen in Table 2 and Figure 4, there was significantly greater activ-
ity during Label compared to Reappraisal in several emotion
regulatory regions, including RVLPFC (54, 21, 6; t = 2.89; 48
voxels), LVLPFC (−45, 39, 3; t = 3.99; 42 voxels), RDLPFC
(33, 33, 30; t = 4.32; 149 voxels; 27, 0, 57; t = 4.02; 25 vox-
els), LDLPFC (−36, 36, 27; t = 5.63; 93 voxels and −42, 0,
A B
FIGURE 2 | Self-reported unpleasantness. (A) Average self-reported
unpleasantness, as rated immediately following blocks of passive
observation, affect labeling, and reappraisal, on a scale from 0 (not at all
unpleasant) to 3 (extremely unpleasant). (B) Significant positive correlation of
self-reported unpleasantness for the reappraisal and affect labeling
conditions.
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Table 1 | Common activations for Labeling and Reappraisal relative to
Observe-only.
x y z t Voxels
COMMON REGIONS OF ACTIVATION (CONJUNCTION OF LABEL >
OBSERVE AND REAPPRAISE > OBSERVE)
VLPFC/inferior frontal
gyrus
R 51 27 0 3.23 29
VLPFC/inferior frontal
gyrus
L −54 30 6 3.22 505
DLPFC/middle frontal
gyrus
L −57 21 33 3.17 *
DLPFC/superior/middle
frontal gyrus
L −33 3 63 3.71 *
DLPFC/middle frontal
gyrus
R 51 24 45 2.92 106
R 48 33 33 2.82 *
DLPFC/middle frontal
gyrus
R 21 57 30 2.67 65
DLPFC/precentral gyrus R 36 3 60 3.10 519
DMPFC/superior frontal
gyrus
0 −6 75 3.90 *
L −3 3 69 3.64 *
DMPFC/superior frontal
gyrus
R 12 15 48 2.00 27
Middle temporal gyrus L −57 −48 6 2.88 82
Occipital lobe R 15 81 12 3.39 537
L −21 −87 −12 2.81 *
Cerebellum R 36 −66 −21 2.10 *
Cerebellum/fusiform gyrus L −33 −72 −18 3.07 *
Brainstem 0 −30 −12 2.53 74
COMMON REGIONS OF DE-ACTIVATION (CONJUNCTION OF LABEL
< OBSERVE AND REAPPRAISE < OBSERVE)
Amygdala/parahippocampal
gyrus
L −30 0 −21 2.98 134
Amygdala R 24 −6 −15 2.04 10
VMPFC L −3 48 −3 2.55 60
R 3 54 −9 2.26 *
Subgenual ACC/VMPFC R 3 27 −3 3.12 94
Medial
temporal/peri-amygdala
R 42 −3 −15 3.02 76
Fusiform gyrus R 36 −42 −18 2.60 89
Parietal cortex/precuneus L −15 −42 48 3.07 64
Conjunction analyses were thresholded with an uncorrected p-value of 0.003
combined with an extent threshold of 4 and 24 contiguous voxels for a priori
amygdala and PFC ROIs, respectively, and 43 contiguous voxels for all other
regions, correcting for multiple comparisons using AlphaSim.
*Denotes same cluster as immediately above. VLPFC, ventrolateral prefrontal
cortex; DLPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; VMPFC, ventromedial prefrontal
cortex; DMPFC, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex.
33; t = 3.88; 54 voxels), and posterior DMPFC/Supplementary
motor area (0, 0, 57; t = 3.54; 95 voxels). After applying the
ShapeMatch-basedmotor responsemask, the activations in bilat-
eral VLPFC and the more anterior portions of bilateral DLPFC
(33, 33, 30 and −36, 36, 27) were no longer included. In other
words, the greater activity seen in bilateral VLPFC and anterior
DLPFC during Label > Reappraise does not appear to be a func-
tion of the basic motor response processes of affect labeling since
FIGURE 3 | Common activations for Labeling and Reappraisal relative
to Observe only. Areas in red were commonly activated relative to the
Observe condition. Areas in blue were commonly deactivated relative to
the Observe condition.
these areas did not overlap with the activations associated with
the non-emotional motor response task (i.e., Shape Match).
There was no activity in any lateral PFC regulatory region
that was greater during Reappraisal compared to Label. There
was greater activity during Reappraisal compared to Label in
VMPFC and subgenual ACC, which have been associated with
emotion regulation in some studies. Also, of note, there were no
significant differences in amygdala activation when comparing
Reappraise and Label directly, suggesting that neither strategy was
significantly more effective than the other in reducing amygdala
activity.
DISCUSSION
Using fMRI, we examined the common and divergent patterns of
neural activity associated with affect labeling and reappraisal of
emotional experiences. Results are noteworthy in that, first, we
found that affect labeling of one’s own emotions produces a sim-
ilar neural pattern as affect labeling of the emotional aspects of
external stimuli in other samples, namely, increased RVLPFC and
decreased amygdala (Lieberman et al., 2007).
Second, we observed that affect labeling and reappraisal were
associated with significant overlapping activations in multiple
prefrontal regions associated with regulatory processes, includ-
ing bilateral VLPFC, bilateral DLPFC, and posterior DMPFC, as
well as significant overlapping deactivations in bilateral amygdala.
These findings are generally consistent with previous research
examining each strategy separately (Ochsner and Gross, 2005;
Berkman and Lieberman, 2009). More importantly, as the first
well-powered study examining the two strategies in a single group
of participants, these results also confirm that affect labeling and
reappraisal share common neural mechanisms.
The extent of this overlap may seem surprising given that
affect labeling and reappraisal are very different processes at an
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Table 2 | Differential activations for Labeling and Reappraising
compared directly.
x y z t Voxels
REGIONS OF ACTIVATION FOR LABEL > REAPPRAISE
VLPFC/inferior frontal
gyrus
L −45 39 3 3.99 42
VLPFC/inferior frontal
gyrus
R 42 18 12 3.74 48
R 54 21 6 2.89 *
DLPFC/middle frontal
gyrus
L −36 36 27 5.63 93
DLPFC/middle frontal
gyrus
R 33 33 30 4.32 149
DLPFC/precentral gyrus† L −42 0 33 3.88 54
DLPFC/precentral gyrus† R 27 0 57 4.02 25
DMPFC/supplementary
motor area†
0 0 57 3.54 95
Posterior cingulate cortex L −3 −33 30 4.25 48
Precuneus† R 12 −75 60 6.76 1720
Precentral gyrus† L −39 −15 66 4.65 *
Inferior parietal cortex† L −36 −45 48 6.00 *
R 36 −48 42 4.97 *
Superior parietal cortex† L −27 −66 51 4.99 *
Interior parietal cortex† L −51 −24 21 4.42 76
Cerebellum† L 9 −60 −15 6.76 1154
L −48 −57 −30 5.02 224
REGIONS OF ACTIVATION FOR REAPPRAISE > LABEL
VMPFC 0 33 −21 4.23 28
VMPFC L −3 51 −9 4.30 29
Subgenual ACC 0 18 −12 3.60 40
Parietal cortex R 15 −36 72 3.65 45
Occipital lobe L −15 −102 15 6.95 618
R 15 −99 15 8.84 *
Activations were thresholded using an uncorrected p-value of 0.005 combined
with an extent threshold of 4 and 24 contiguous voxels for a priori amygdala and
PFC ROIs, respectively, and 43 contiguous voxels for all other regions, correcting
for multiple comparisons using AlphaSim. †Signifies activations that overlapped
with those seen during the basic motor response task (Shape Match).
*Denotes same cluster as immediately above. VLPFC: ventrolateral prefrontal
cortex. DLPFC: dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. VMPFC: ventromedial prefrontal
cortex. DMPFC: dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. ACC: anterior cingulate cortex.
experiential level. Reappraisal involves conscious, deliberate, and
effortful attempts to change cognitions and felt emotions. In con-
trast, affect labeling involves self-reflection and verbalization of
one’s current emotional state, and notably, does not involve any
conscious attempts to change one’s cognitions or emotions. One
might begin to interpret the overlapping prefrontal activations
observed in this study by examining possible sub-processes that
are shared by these seemingly distinct emotion regulation strate-
gies and subserved by the overlapping neural regions. Both reap-
praisal and affect labeling likely involve (1) long-term memory
retrieval and selection processes to either facilitate the implemen-
tation of an alternate interpretation (reappraisal) or the identi-
fication of current feelings (labeling), (2) attention management
and conflict resolution processes to deal with counterproductive
FIGURE 4 | Distinct activations for Labeling vs. Reappraisal. Areas in
green represent greater activation for Labeling relative to Reappraisal. Areas
in yellow represent greater activation for Reappraisal relative to Labeling.
or task-interfering cognitions, (3) working memory and self-
reflection processes to facilitate self-monitoring for regulation
success (reappraisal) or emotion identification (labeling), (4) ver-
bal processing associated with self-talk (reappraisal) or emotion
labeling, and of course, (5) inhibitory processing to dampen
affective responding (Ochsner and Gross, 2005; Berkman and
Lieberman, 2009; Kalisch, 2009). In some cases, reappraisal may
even explicitly involve affect labeling (e.g., “I feel anxious looking
at the spider but I am not in danger since it is just a photo-
graph”). The regions commonly activated for reappraisal and
labeling, particularly bilateral VLPFC and DLPFC, have been
shown to play key roles in these processes (Fletcher and Henson,
2001; Ochsner and Gross, 2005; Berkman and Lieberman, 2009;
Kalisch, 2009). However, given that these regions each sub-
serve multiple types of processing and the present study was
not designed to test for specific sub-processes, it is not possi-
ble to definitively conclude that the overlapping activations here
represent specific common neurocognitive processes (Poldrack,
2006). Nevertheless, results do support a common neural basis
for reappraisal and affect labeling. More generally, results provide
support for the idea that intentional and incidental emotion regu-
lation utilize similar neurocognitive mechanisms, despite distinct
experiential qualities, explicit goals, and partially overlapping
sub-processes.
Unexpectedly, results also indicated that affect labeling
engaged many of the commonly activated prefrontal regions to
a greater extent than reappraisal. The greater VLPFC and DLPFC
activity seen during affect labeling should not be interpreted to
mean greater emotion down-regulation as there were no signifi-
cant differences in amygdala or other limbic activity between the
two conditions, and it was the reappraisal condition that yielded
larger reductions in self-reported unpleasantness. Additionally,
given that these regions did not overlap with the activations dur-
ing a non-emotional Shape Match motor response task, it also
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A B
FIGURE 5 | Amygdala reductions. (A) Magnetic resonance image
showing common regions of bilateral amygdala de-activation during
affect labeling and reappraisal relative to passive observation; and (B)
parameter estimates of activity extracted from the portion of these
clusters that lies within our anatomical amygdala ROIs (AAL) and
plotted relative to the shape match control condition for illustration
purposes. Error bars represent differences with respect to Shape
Match.
does not appear that these activations are due to the differences
in motor processing between affect labeling and reappraisal.
Nevertheless, it remains a possibility that the different response
modalities of affect labeling and reappraisal may have influenced
these results. For example, the greater PFC activation seen during
affect labeling relative to reappraisal may reflect differential effort,
task difficulty, attention, or engagement. For example, affect
labeling involved selecting an option from three choices provided
and pressing the appropriate button, a process involving poten-
tial evaluation by experimenters. In contrast, reappraisal involved
more free-form cognitive processing with no physical response
required or evaluation possible. As such, participants may have
been more engaged in the affect labeling condition, knowing that
their performance could be evaluated. Alternatively, it is possible
that there was less variability in the processes engaged in the affect
labeling condition across participants and this led to more consis-
tent, and thus, significant activations. That is, in the affect labeling
condition, participants thought about how they felt, examined
the emotional response options, and chose one. While the felt
emotions may have varied across participants, the process of
emotion labeling was likely quite consistent. In contrast, the reap-
praisal condition likely involved many more diverse processes.
Unfortunately, we do not have a metric to assess task adher-
ence or specific cognitive processes utilized in each condition as a
manipulation check.
Results also indicated that reappraisal was more effective than
labeling in reducing self-reported feelings of unpleasantness,
which is consistent with previous studies (Lieberman et al., 2011).
However, despite these differences in self-reported unpleasant-
ness, reappraisal and labeling yielded similar emotion down-
regulation at the neural level, as indexed by similar amygdala
deactivation. There are two explanations that may reconcile
these seemingly disparate findings. First, it is possible that these
findings reflect biases of demand characteristics. Specifically,
for the reappraisal condition, participants were explicitly told
the goal was to decrease their negative emotional responses,
whereas the labeling condition did not involve such an instruc-
tion. Thus, given that people expect reappraisal to diminish
emotional distress (Lieberman et al., 2011) self-reported dis-
tress reductions may be biased to some degree. On the other
hand, amygdala activity is only one of several neural indica-
tors of emotional responding and thus the effects may be due
to differences in other undetected neurocognitive processes. It
should also be noted that although the reductions in self-reported
distress between affect labeling and reappraisal were statisti-
cally significant, they may not represent meaningful experiential
differences.
Finally, results also indicated that while participants displayed
a similar self-reported unpleasantness response pattern in general
across conditions, as reflected by correlated ratings overall, ratings
for labeling and reappraisal continued to be positively correlated
when controlling for passive observation ratings. This suggests
there may be consistency of emotion regulation efficacy across
multiple regulation strategies.
The present study does have limitations. First, as mentioned
above, this study did not include a measure of task adherence
and therefore, it is possible that participants were not exclusively
engaging in reappraisal and affect labeling when instructed to
do so. Second, the affect labeling and reappraisal conditions in
this study required different response modalities. Future stud-
ies would be improved by having participants simply label the
emotion they are feeling internally to remove the behavioral and
performance aspects unique to labeling in the present study.
Third, we were not able to generate independent indices of amyg-
dala reductions for labeling and reappraisal because both would
be contrasted with the same amygdala activity during observe,
and therefore correlations would be inflated and biased. Fourth,
while personally-relevant affect labeling in this study yielded a
similar pattern of neural activity as affect labeling of external
stimuli in previous studies, there are likely to be some subtle dif-
ferences (e.g., McRae et al., 2010). Future studies can address
this issue by including both conditions in the same neuroimag-
ing study. Also, our sample was unexpectedly disproportion-
ately female and this limits the generalizability of our findings
somewhat. Finally, the older age range of participants in the
present study also limits the generalizability of the results to some
extent. However, given the relatively strict inclusion and exclu-
sion criteria, the present sample was quite healthy, minimizing
the differences in neural functioning between this sample and
younger adults that would stem from illness or disease more
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commonly seen in older adults in general. Furthermore, we note
that most studies of emotion regulation have been conducted in
younger adult samples (often college students), and thus, far less
is known about neural emotion regulation in older adults (e.g., St.
Jacques et al., 2010). Therefore, our focus on a sample of healthy
older adults (aged 55–75) makes an important contribution by
showing that there is stability in neural emotion regulation pat-
terns later in life (cf. Ochsner et al., 2002; Lieberman et al.,
2007).
In conclusion, results suggest common neurocognitive mecha-
nisms supporting affect labeling and reappraisal, thereby provid-
ing support for the idea that intentional and incidental emotion
regulation involve overlapping neural mechanisms. In addition to
providing insights into this pervasive and influential component
of human experience, results also have possible clinical implica-
tions. For example, results suggest that an individual who is able
to effectively utilize one strategy may be proportionately able to
utilize another strategy. Accordingly, strategies to strengthen or
otherwise increase the effectiveness of one strategy may have far
reaching effects, acting to incidentally increase the effectiveness of
other regulation strategies. For example, ongoing work in our lab
is exploring the idea of affect labeling as a relatively simple means
to improve emotion regulation ability. Conversely, dysfunctions
in these regulatory regions would unfortunately extend to mul-
tiple emotion regulation processes, suggesting a possible reason
why some emotional disorders, such as depression can be so dif-
ficult to treat. Future research should further examine the specific
neurocognitive processes that underlie intentional and inciden-
tal emotion regulation, as well as examine possible means for
enhancing the effectiveness of these strategies.
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